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1 Introduction
Ricardian Equivalence suggests that government attempts to influence demand us-
ing fiscal policy will prove fruitless. As the idea of Ricardian equivalence contrasts
with alternative Keynesian theories, it has been extraordinarily important within
the academic debate over government debt (See Seater (1993) and Elmendorf and
Mankiw (1999) for an analysis of this theoretical and empirical debate).
In 1974 Barro revived Ricardo’s idea of the offsetting of public by private trans-
fers, leading to the neutrality of public debt. Barro’s analysis of debt neutrality
is based on the assumption that individuals are motivated by a special form of in-
tergenerational altruism (dynastic altruism), whereby individuals have an altruistic
concern for their children, who in turn also have altruistic feelings for their own
children, and so on. Through such a recursive relation all generations of a single
family (a dynasty) are linked together by a chain of private intergenerational trans-
fers, countervailing any attempt by the government to redistribute resources across
generations. This offsetting of public by private transfers operates only if bequests
are positive. This is a crucial qualification to Barro’s debt neutrality result.1
The aim of this paper is to show that, contrary to widespread belief, the strictly
positivity of bequest is only a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition to obtain
the Barro’s debt neutrality result. Indeed, we construct in this paper public debt
policies which affect the competitive equilibrium allocation even when bequests are
strictly positive in all periods: a violation of Ricardian equivalence.
To construct non-neutral public debt policies in the Barro (1974)’s setting, we
exploit a discrepancy between the transversality condition of a social planner prob-
lem and the one of altruistically-linked overlapping generations. In the former, the
discounted value of wealth tends to zero whereas in the latter the discounted value
of bequests tends to zero. As the bequest of an altruistic agent, who lives a finite
number of periods, only includes the wealth transmitted to the next generation (and
not all the assets of the economy), the transversality condition of a social planner
1This important issue has been studied by several economists. Following Philippe Weil’s 1987
seminal article, there now exist some explicit conditions under which bequests are positive (see,
e.g., Abel (1987) or, recently, Thibault (2004, 2005)).
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implies the one of an altruist; but the converse is not necessarily true.
According to this difference, the intertemporal budget constraint of the govern-
ment is not the mirror of the intertemporal budget constraint of a private agent and
we can exhibit non-neutral public debt policies such that both the government debt
is honored at each date and the government deficit is sustainable in the long-run.
Then, the necessary and sufficient condition to retrieve the Barro’s debt neutrality
proposition is that both the bequests are strictly positive and the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government holds. However, this latter condition is not
an intertemporal equilibrium condition and is still debated in OLG economies (see,
e.g., Wilcox (1989) or, recently, de la Croix and Michel (2002) for main outlines on
this issue).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the characterization
of the intertemporal equilibrium of the dynastic altruism model and the comparison
with the planner’s optimal solution. In Section 3, we establish the existence of non-
neutral public debt policies in the Barro (1974)’s setting. The algorithm to construct
non-neutral public debt policy is collected in Appendix A.
2 The dynastic altruism framework
In this section, we examine the intertemporal equilibrium of the dynastic altruism
model, assuming that production occurs according to a neoclassical production func-
tion. After characterizing this competitive intertemporal equilibrium, we compare
it with the optimal growth path chosen by a social planner.
 Intertemporal equilibrium of the dynastic altruism economy.
In this subsection, the Barro (1974)-Weil (1987) framework is introduced and in-
tertemporal equilibria of this model are defined. We consider a perfectly competitive
economy which extends over infinite discrete time. Production occurs according to
a constant returns to scale technology F (Kt, Lt) using two inputs, capital, Kt, and
labor, Lt. The production function is homogenous of degree one, allowing us to write
output per unit of labor as a function of capital per unit of labor: f(k) = F (k, 1)
where k = K/L is the capital stock per unit of labor. For all positive k we assume
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that f(k) > 0, f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0. Capital fully depreciates after one period.
Since markets are perfectly competitive, each factor is paid its marginal product
(the wage wt and the interest factor Rt):
wt = f(kt)− ktf
′(kt) and Rt = f
′(kt) (1)
Individuals are identical within as well as across generations and live for two
periods. In each period t, Nt individuals are born, where Nt grows at rate n. Young
altruists born at time t supply one unit of labor, receive the market wage wt, inherit
xt, consume ct and save st. They consume dt+1, part of the proceeds of their savings,
and leave a non-negative bequest xt+1 to each of their 1 + n children when they are
old.
Agents are price-takers and face the following budget constraints:
xt + wt = ct + st (2)
Rt+1st = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 with xt+1 ≥ 0 (3)
The life-cycle utility U(ct, dt+1) of an agent depends on his consumptions ct and
dt+1. The definition of altruism adopted by Barro (1974) is the following: parents
care about their children’s welfare by weighting their children’s utility in their own




U(ct, dt+1) + γVt+1(xt+1)
}
s.t. (2) and (3).
where Vt+1(xt+1) denotes the utility of a representative descendant who inherits xt+1.
Parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is the intergenerational discount factor or degree of altruism.2
To characterize the solution of this Bellman Equation,3 we consider the La-
grangean Lt of period t:
Lt = U(ct, dt+1) +
γ
1 + n
pt+1[Rt+1(xt + wt − ct)− dt+1]− ptxt
2We retrieve the standard Diamond (1965) model when γ = 0.
3For a thorough presentation of this discrete time optimization, see Mc Kenzie (1986).
3
which is equal to the sum of the life-cycle utility U(ct, dt+1) and the increase in the
shadow value (in terms of utility) of xt over one period,
4 γpt+1xt+1 − ptxt.
For all t ≥ 0, maximizing the Lagrangean with respect to ct and dt+1 gives:













pt+1Rt+1 ≤ 0 (= 0 if xt > 0)
And the transversality condition is:5 lim
t→+∞
γtptxt = 0.
Given the purpose of our paper, we can simplify its mathematical treatment by
adopting a log-linear life-cycle utility: U(ct, dt+1) = ln ct + β ln dt+1 with β > 0.
Then, merging the previous equations, the (necessary and sufficient) first-order
conditions for an interior optimum with operative bequest motive (i.e., xt+1 > 0) can



















Thus, the conditions (2) to (5) and (Tx) characterize the behavior of an altruist
when bequests are strictly positive.
The equilibrium conditions on the labor market and the good market are respec-
tively Lt = Nt and F (Kt, Lt) = Ntct +Nt−1dt +Kt+1.
4The current shadow price pt+1 of bequest xt+1 in period t+ 1 is discounted by the factor γ in
order to define the increase in shadow value (calculated) in period t.
5The transversality condition is sufficient for optimality. It is necessary if a feasible path with
zero bequest provides a finite value to the objective function (see Michel (1982, 1990)).
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The capital stock of period t+1 is financed by the savings of the generation born
in t: Kt+1 = Ntst. Hence, in intensive form, we have on the good market:




The initial conditions k0 = K0/N0, x0 ≥ 0 and d0 > 0 are given and verify:
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d0 + (1 + n)x0 = R0(1 + n)k0 = f
′(k0)(1 + n)k0 (7)
By definition, conditions (2) to (7) and (Tx) characterize an intertemporal equi-
librium {cˆt, dˆt+1, xˆt+1, kˆt+1}t≥0 of the dynastic altruism economy. In the rest of this
paper we assume the uniqueness of this intertemporal equilibrium.
 Comparison with the planner’s optimal solution.
Importantly, since bequests xˆt+1 are strictly positive at all dates t, it is well-
known (see, e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989)) that the sequence {cˆt, dˆt+1, kˆt+1}t≥0





7 by a social planner.
Indeed, the objectiveW of the social planner is to maximize the sum of the life-cycle
utility of all current and future generations, discounted at rate γ and subject to the









γt[ln ct + β ln dt+1]
s.t. (6).
The solution of the social planning problem necessarily satisfies both the resource
constraint (6) and the trade-off conditions (4) with Rt+1 = f
′(kt+1) and (5). Finally,







These conditions are sufficient to determine the optimal path associated with
the optimal growth problem (namely, the optimal growth path). Then, according to
(1) and (4) to (6), the dynamics of the optimal growth path are defined by:
6In order to simplify our study, we assume that d0 is given; a thorough analysis of the first old
agents is available in Michel, Thibault and Vidal (2006).













After substitution of dt, these arbitrage and resource (AR) conditions
8 define a
dynamic system (ct, kt) of dimension two. Initial values of k0 (and d0) are given but
not c0. Then, it is the transversality condition (Tk) which allows to determine the
optimal initial consumption c⋆0. However, note that there are many other solutions
to equations (AR). In fact, for any 0 < c0 < c
⋆
0, there exists a unique solution of
(AR).9














Figure 1: The optimal growth path
When the production function satisfies Inada conditions, the modified golden
rule capital stock kγ exists (f
′(kγ) = (1 + n)/γ). The optimal path (represented
with double arrows in our figure) converges to kγ and all the others paths satisfying
the (AR) conditions converge to k˜ (the positive solution of f(k) = (1 + n)k).
We have also represented the case in which the lowest marginal productivity
lim
k→+∞
f ′(k) is positive and larger than γ/(1+n). In such a case, for all feasible paths
8When (1) is satisfied, the conditions (4) to (6) are equivalent to (AR).
9Note that, for c0 > c
⋆
0, solutions of equation (1 + n)kt+1 = f(kt)− ct − dt/(1 + n) cease to be
defined because kt would become negative.
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starting from c0 < c
⋆
0, we have ct+1/ct > 1 and ct and kt tend to +∞.
We conclude this section by remarking that condition (Tk) is equivalent to the
intertemporal budget constraint of a government in the decentralized economy. But
this condition is not a consequence of the private intertemporal equilibrium condition
which is equivalent to (Tx). We come back to this important issue in the next section.
3 The debt non-neutrality result
In this section we first exhibit an algorithm to construct public debt policies which
affect the competitive equilibrium allocation even when bequests are strictly posi-
tive in all periods: a violation of Ricardian equivalence. Then, we discuss both the
robustness and the relevancy of these non-neutral public debt policies.
 Existence of non-neutral public debt policies.
To illustrate the non-neutrality of public debt in Barro’s (1974) model, we assume
that, at each period t, government issues a public debt Bt. This debt must repay
the debt of the preceding period Bt−1 plus the accrued interest. It is financed by a
lump-sum tax τt on the income of the young households. The government always
honors its debt. We thus have: Bt = RtBt−1 − Ntτt; or in intensive form, with
bt = Bt−1/Nt the debt stock per young household at the beginning of period t:
(1 + n)bt+1 = Rtbt − τt = f
′(kt)bt − τt (8)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the initial debt b0 is nil.
Note that in the definition of the intertemporal equilibrium with public debt,
there are only two changes. Indeed, the budget constraint of the young is now:
xt + wt − τt = ct + st (9)
and savings finance both the capital stock and the public debt: Ntst = Kt+1 + Bt,
or equivalently:
st = (1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1) (10)
According to Barro (1974), this government debt policy redistributes the tax
burden among generations. But families, smoothing their consumption over time,
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reverse the effects of this redistribution through their bequests. Thus, government
debt seems to be completely neutral because the overlapping generations of altruists
linked by strictly positive bequests can be interpreted as a social planner.
This intuition is reinforced by the fact that, according to the previous section,
the equivalence between an intertemporal equilibrium {cˆt, dˆt+1, kˆt+1}t≥0 of the dy-




t+1}t≥0 is valid when
there is no public debt.
However, we show in the next proposition that this equivalence is not always valid
when the government issues debt. Consequently, there exist non-neutral public debt
policies in Barro’s (1974) model.
Proposition 1 The debt non-neutrality result
Public debt is non-neutral. More precisely, any sequences of consumptions, capi-
tal stock and positive bequests that satisfy the arbitrage and resource conditions (AR)
and the transversality condition (Tx) define an intertemporal equilibrium with debt.
As shown in Appendix A, for any sequence {c¯t, d¯t+1, k¯t+1}t≥0 of consumptions








there exists a sequence of values {b¯t+1}t≥0 defined by:
(1 + n)b¯t+1 =
d¯t+1 + (1 + n)x¯t+1
f ′(k¯t+1)
− (1 + n)k¯t+1 (11)
such that {c¯t, d¯t+1, x¯t+1, k¯t+1, b¯t+1}t≥0 corresponds to an intertemporal equilibrium
with debt b¯t+1 and bequest x¯t+1. This implies that any path of consumptions and
capital stock satisfying (AR) corresponds to an intertemporal equilibrium with debt
and positive bequest. Indeed it is sufficient to choose x¯t = c¯t, t ≥ 1.
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We now discuss the intuition underlying our non-neutrality result. For each se-
quence of consumptions, capital stock and positive bequests that satisfies (AR) and
(Tx) (but not (Tk)), a public debt path is shown to be non-neutral in the framework
10Note that x0 (= x¯0) is unchanged and satisfies (7).
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of Barro (1974). Even if these sequences of consumptions, capital stock and positive
bequests may tend to some extreme values, they allow us to show that an infinite
number of non-neutral public debt paths exists in Barro (1974).
Then, this non-neutrality property of government debt can be due to the dif-
ference between the transversality condition of a social planning problem and the
one of altruistically-linked overlapping generations. Intuitively, there always exist
public debt policies (i.e., intergenerational redistributions) such that their intro-
duction implies that the wealth discounted value does not tend to zero while the
bequests discounted value tend to zero. As already shown, the intertemporal bud-
get constraint of the government (Tk) is not the mirror of the intertemporal budget
constraint of a private agent (here, equation (Tx)).
Notice that the literature on the sustainability of government deficit has increas-
ingly focused on the role of the intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
In this literature, sustainability should be understood in the sense of solvency (see,
e.g., Wilcox (1989) or Buiter and Kletzer (1998)).
In OLG models, de la Croix and Michel (2002, chapter 4) show that the conclu-
sion on whether the intertemporal budget constraint of the government should hold
depends crucially on the number of available fiscal instruments. When there are two
types of taxes (three instruments) there is no restriction on government borrowing.
On the contrary, when there is only one type of tax (two instruments) the debt
level that can decentralized a given trajectory is determined. However, this unique
debt trajectory may or may not satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government, depending on the accumulation regime (under or over accumulation).
Our result exhibits some similarities with that obtained by Crettez, Michel and
Wigniolle (2002) in the Ramsey (1928)’s framework. They show that for a given
path of government expenditures, there generally exists a continuum of equilibria
(characterized by different paths of consumption and leisure) depending on various
debt policies. The infinitely lived representative consumer model used by Cret-
tez, Michel and Wigniolle (2002) appears as a more drastic framework than our
Barro’s framework to obtain the non-neutrality result. Indeed, in Barro’s model,
the transversality condition depends on the bequests, and not on the total amount
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of wealth held by agents.11 This difference explains both why non-ricardian tra-
jectories can be constructed more easily in the Barro’s model and why non-neutral
public debt policies in which government is debtor12 cannot be excluded.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We use three steps to show our debt non-neutrality result:
(i) Step 1: Characterization of intertemporal equilibria with public debt.
We begin to show that a sequence of values of {c¯t, d¯t+1, x¯t+1, k¯t+1, b¯t+1}t≥0 corre-
sponds to an intertemporal equilibrium with debt of the dynastic altruism economy
if and only if it verifies for all t ≥ 0 the arbitrage and resource constraints (AR),






Indeed, (12) is the second budget constraint (3) when st is given by (10). The
others conditions (AR) and (Tx) are not modified. All these conditions are neces-
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sary. To show that they are sufficient, we define prices by (1), savings by (10) and
taxes by (8). Then, it remains only to prove that (9) is verified (all other equilib-
rium conditions result from (AR), (Tx) and (12)). Using (AR) and (8) we have:
c¯t + τt = f(k¯t)− (1 + n)k¯t+1− d¯t/(1 + n) + f
′(k¯t)b¯t − (1 + n)b¯t+1. Using (12) (or (7)
for t = 0) we obtain: c¯t + τt = f(k¯t)− st + x¯t − f
′(k¯t)k¯t = wt − st + x¯t.
(ii) Step 2: Construction of an intertemporal equilibrium with public debt.
Consider a sequence of positive values {c¯t, d¯t+1, k¯t+1}t≥0 which satisfies (AR) and
a sequence of non-negative numbers {x¯t+1}t≥0 which satisfies (Tx). The conditions
(AR), (Tx) and (12) are verified with debt defined by (11) and xt+1 = x¯t+1. Then,
according to Step 1, {c¯t, d¯t+1, x¯t+1, k¯t+1, b¯t+1}t≥0 is an intertemporal equilibrium with
public debt.
(iii) Step 3: Existence of non-neutral public debt policies.
Let {c¯t, d¯t+1, k¯t+1}t≥0 be a sequence of positive values which satisfies (AR) and
(Tx) but does not satisfies (Tk). According to Section 2 (and Figure 1), such a
sequence exists but it is not an optimal growth path. From c¯t we can define x¯t as
follows: x¯t = c¯t. Then, since γ < 1, we have constructed a sequence of positive
numbers {x¯t+1}t≥0 which satisfies (Tx). Hence, according to Step 2, when b¯t+1 is
defined by (12), {c¯t, d¯t+1, x¯t+1, k¯t+1, b¯t+1}t≥0 corresponds to an intertemporal equi-
librium with debt b¯t+1 and strictly positive bequest x¯t+1.
Since each non-optimal trajectory which satisfies (AR) can be an intertemporal
equilibrium with debt, the public debt policy {b¯t+1}t≥0 is non-neutral. Qed.
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